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Abstract 
The control of transportation, including both the track-side and the on-vehicle equipment involves 
more and more electronic components, which can make the control more intelligent and more effective. 
The intelligent vehicle system is one of the most demanding concepts of the present and of the near 
future. By increasing the complexity of the applied electronic systems, much more attention must be 
paid to safety. Controlling safely is an integrated set of activities during the product's life-cycle rather 
than a single point activity during the development. This set of activities is called Safety Management 
System (SMS). In this paper, the features of the SMSs are summarized including their possible aims 
and the basic methods ensuring to achieve the aims. 
Keywords: safety, safety management, risk, dependability. 
1. Introduction 
Since the beginnings of human life, man has had to face situations in which his life 
or his properties could have been lost. The name of these situations is danger which 
means that there is no safety at that moment. In order to be able to compare two 
or more dangerous situations, a new term, risk is introduced. Risk is the measure 
of danger, and often expressed as a function of the frequency of the dangerous 
situations and their impact. 
The deliberate controlling of risk has become more and more important as 
complex, computer or microprocessor based systems are increasingly used both 
on vehicles and in track-side equipment [5]. These systems are applied in order 
to reduce the original (external) risk of a process (e.g. traffic lights at a road 
crossing), but they may generate new dangerous situations (internal risk) which 
requires further risk reduction. The necessary external risk reduction was provided 
earlier by mechanical systems in which the internal risk reduction was reached 
by over-designed mechanical components: their strength ensured the safety level. 
This over-design is not useful for electronic systems in some aspects (certainly at 
the component level it can be a good solution), and due to the complexity, human 
factors have an enormous impact on the safety of the product. The railway industry 
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has created the methods applicable to specify and demonstrate safety of the whole 
railway system as well as its most safety-critical subsystem, the interlocking system 
[ 2 , 3 , 4 ] . 
Beside the companies involved in the railway industry, others working in 
the fields of road and air transportation have to introduce new approaches in or-
der to ensure the safety of the vital functions realized or controlled by electronic 
subsystems. 
The aim of this paper is to describe the basic terms related to safety, the basic 
methods through which the safety level can be estimated and the methods by which 
the estimated safety level can be achieved. The structure of the paper is as follows. 
In Chapter 2 the basic definitions of safety are given. In Chapter 3 we introduce 
the safety management system and emphasize the methods, which can ensure the 
determination of the safety level. In Chapter 4 the practice of different transportation 
sectors is described. Finally in Chapter 5 some conclusions are given. 
2. Basic Definitions of Safety 
2. / . Basic Definitions 
In the following, some basic definitions of the safety management are given [3, 6, 
11]. 
Description Definition 
Risk The probable rate of occurrence of a dangerous situation causing harm 
and the degree of severity of the harm. 
Dependability Basic aspect of quality covering reliability, availability, safety and all 
related notions. 
Safety Freedom of unacceptable risk of harm. 
Reliability The reliability is the probability that the system can perform a required 
function under given conditions for a given time interval. 
Availability The availability of the system is the probability that the system is 
functioning at time t. 
Maintainability Maintainability is the probability that a failed system is restored to the 
functioning state in a given time and in a stated environment, which 
will include the maintenance resources available. 
Safety Integrity The likelihood of a system satisfactorily performing the required 
safety functions under all the stated conditions within a stated pe-
riod of time. 
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 125 
Description Definition 
Safety Integrity 
Level (SIL) 
One of a number of defined discrete levels for specifying the safety 
integrity requirements of the safety functions to be allocated to the 
safety related systems. Safety Integrity Level with the highest figure 
has the highest level of safety integrity. 
2.1.1. Phenomena Affecting Safety 
For the specification of safety we must first separate at least two different causes of 
dangerous situations (Fig. La, Lb): 
1. Component failure, and 
2. Danger in a failure-free operation, 
and a third, but often forgotten source: the risky situations uncovered by the con-
troller (remaining external risk after risk reduction). This third source is not dis-
cussed here. 
Component failures are unintentional events which cannot be eliminated, but 
their rate can be lowered. Component failure is a deviation from one of the specified 
parameters - this deviation is not necessarily followed by any functional problem. 
If a malfunction is triggered by the failure, the phenomenon is called fault. Certain 
techniques can be used to eliminate the consequences of a fault to the whole system 
(e.g. redundancy, fault-masking, re-configuration etc.). In some cases, the effects 
of faults can be observed at the system level, and these effects result in dangerous 
situations. Our goal is to specify the allowed rate of dangerous situations (in the 
railway technology, this rate is called Tolerable Hazard Rate, THR). The allowed 
rate is well expressible and quantitative approaches are developed for providing the 
figures. As component failure rates are also predictable or measurable, it can be 
proved whether the system (including its components with given failure rates) can 
meet the allowed rate of dangerous events. 
Besides the component failures, we must pay attention to another source of 
malfunctions: the mentioned malfunctions arise during the failure-free state of the 
system, because they originate from incomplete or improper human actions - errors 
made in the specification, development etc. phases. Since we have no information 
on the probability or the frequency of these errors, it cannot be possible to set 
quantitative requirements for them. The only way to prevent the errors is to specify 
certain procedures applicable in different phases of the life-cycle: independent 
checks (often called as verification and validation), documentation to be prepared, 
developing and analyzing methods to be used etc. The degree of protection is 
expressed as a figure and called Safety Integrity Level (SIL) The higher the SIL 
figure, the higher the degree of protection is and the more rigorous the applicable 
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procedures are. Certainly, the protection against random failures and the protection 
against human errors must be balanced (see Fig. 2). Thus in some cases, the SIL is 
determined based on the allowed dangerous situation frequency. 
Failure-free operation 
Correct functions 
Failures 
Faults 
Danger 
Preventive 
Maintenance 
Corrective 
Maintenance 
Danger due to 
incorrect design 
Danger due to 
failure 
Fig. J.a. SIL concept 
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Danger due to 
failure 
Danger 
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Design criteria are too rigorous Design criteria are too loose 
Fig. Lb. SIL determination 
3. Safety Management Systems 
Safety Management System (SMS) covers all the activities which are carried out in 
order to specify and ensure the desired level of safety. We must note that these activ-
ities are not limited to the activities during the specification and design phases, but 
include the activities during the installation, operation and withdrawal. A possible 
flow-chart is shown in Fig. 2. 
The basic aims of the SMS can be: 
1. To specify and guarantee the level of safety, 
2. To simply enhance the safety of the system or 
3. To enhance the availability of the system 
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In the following, the main activities of the process are summarized. Certainly, 
deviations from the shown SMS structure can be applied, e.g. in some processes, 
the definition of the safety integrity level is determined after the system structure is 
finalized and subsystems are separated. 
Definition of 
safety target(s) 
T Definition of 
safety level(s) 
I 
Definition of the 
safety integrity level 
System 
architecture 
design 
Software 
architecture 
design 
Integration 
Operation including 
maintenance 
- * o ^ 
I - Hi 
*3 3 
i - . - r j 
Fig. 2. Basic safety activities during the product life-cycle 
3.1. Definition of Safety Targets 
The first step in a safety management system is the clarification of the safety related 
functions. Safety functions (often called as vital functions) are functions which can 
cause dangerous situations if they are not properly executed. We must note that at 
this point only functions can be analyzed, since the system corresponding to the 
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requirements has not been designed. 
After the safety-related functions have been determined, all possible hazards, 
hazardous events and their causes and consequences, like events, situations and 
effects that potentially cause the system to deviate from normal behaviour must 
be identified. These hazards and hazardous events should be generated from vari-
ous viewpoints. For example: an operational viewpoint (what went wrong in the 
past), a functional viewpoint (failure conditions, human errors), a cognitive view-
point (operator internal states and strategies, experience, training), an organizational 
viewpoint (general working conditions, CRM, culture), and a safety management 
viewpoint (both proactive - to improve the chances to avoid entering the adverse 
condition at all, and reactive - to improve the chances to escape from the adverse 
condition prior to its appearance). Hazards may be obtained from incident or ac-
cident reports, existing hazard databases, etc. An important activity is to identify 
sources of statistical information (documents and databases on incidents and acci-
dents) and get the experts' opinion about the frequency of occurrence of the hazards 
and hazardous events identified. 
3.2. Definition of Safety Levels 
The tolerable loss of goods (tolerable dangerous situation frequency) can be calcu-
lated based on a risk analysis. Risk can be expressed as a function of the frequency 
of the event to be avoided (the hazard) and the possible consequences of the event. 
The quantification of risk is a very difficult process and often only categorization is 
used. 
Risk tolerability depends on the tolerability level of the society and the ap-
plicable economic resources (See Fig. 3) [7]. On the one hand, a certain level of 
risk cannot be tolerated even when the resources are not sufficient for the reduction 
- these systems are not allowed to be operated. On the other hand, there is a level 
of risk which falls below the average risk of the human life, thus no further risk 
reduction is necessary. The large gap between the two extremities is the ALARP 
(As-Low-As-Reasonably-Practicablc) range, in which the tolerability depends on 
the cost of the further risk reduction. 
The safety level is often determined based on the examination of the existing 
systems. A good solution is the French GAMAB principle which states that all new 
systems have to be at least as safe as the existing systems - therefore, the tolerability 
criteria can be calculated evaluating existing statistical data. 
Irrespective of the selected method, the result of this section of safety man-
agement is the allowed frequency of dangerous events caused by random failures. 
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Cost of risk reduction 
Fig. 3. Risk tolerability estimation 
3.3. Definition of the Safety Integrity Level 
If allowed frequencies of dangerous events are set, also the required risk reduction 
for human errors has to be allocated. In some cases, SIL is a simple function of 
the calculated frequency. The SIL determines the necessary independence of the 
participants in the project, the required verification and validation phases as well as 
the documents to be prepared. 
3.4. System and Software Architecture Design, Integration 
In the design phase it must be ensured that the system under development will meet 
the requirements. Be careful that SIL requirements can be fulfilled only if the SIL 
determined actions are taken during the development. Hardware configuration de-
sign involves some basic techniques of dependability analysis such as Failure Mode 
and Effect Analysis (FMEA) or Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). FMEA is a bottom-up 
method, starting from the individual component failure modes and analyzing their 
effects and their detection, thus it can support the design continuously. FTA is a 
top-down method, starting from the pre-defined system malfunctions and examines 
which failure-combinations can lead to them, thus FTA is useful after a design 
phase [9]. 
If FMEA of FTA (or a different method) shows that the current system archi-
tecture cannot meet the requirements, some basic dependability techniques must be 
applied such as adding redundancies to the system, integrating some fault-detection 
and correction algorithms etc [1, 8, 10]. Some of the applicable methods are hard-
ware related, while others are software related ones. Because of this fact, hardware 
and software must be developed together - this is called as hardware-software co-
design. 
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The requirements can be met not only by means of design techniques, but 
by specifying some operational restrictions or some routine tasks. The long-time 
(life-cycle) dependability is based upon the success of these tasks. 
3.5. Operation 
The safety requirements concern not only the design phase: it is not enough to 
prove the safety of the system or a product after the design, the safety level must 
be maintained during the life-cycle. This requires preventive and/or corrective 
maintenance activities, as well as training of the users/operators and maintenance 
staff too. 
3.6. Feedbacks 
One of the key issues of safety management is the feedback from the real life. 
Truly successful systems have long time experience which can result the continuous 
evolution of the safety targets, levels or the system structure. Based on Fig. 3, the 
applicable (practicable) techniques are also in change. 
4. Current Status of the Application of Safety Management in 
Transportation Sectors 
4.1. Background 
In transportation, two areas are traditionally safety-critical: air and railway trans-
portation. In these areas the safety level can easily be controlled due to the following 
reasons: 
• The number of operators (airlines or railways) is relatively low, 
• The personnel involved in the operation are well-educated and trained, 
• The number of the manufacturers of main systems is relatively low. 
In these areas, the control of safety is necessary since the speed is high and 
so is the original risk. 
The other two main areas of transportation have no significant, widely ac-
cepted safety management system as a consequence of the low speed in water 
transportation, and of the large number of operators and manufacturers in road 
transportation. 
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4.2. Air Transportation 
In air transportation, definition of safety levels (Tolerable Hazard Rates) is sup-
ported by an authorized method. The Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) has issued 
the JAR No. 25, in which each failure condition is classified by its severity. (Quali-
tative definitions of severity are given in Table / . ) These definitions are commonly 
accepted in civil aviation. 
Table 1. Definitions of severity categories according to JAR 25 
Description Definition 
Catastrophic Failure conditions which would prevent continued safe flight and 
landing. 
Hazardous Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the airplane 
or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions 
to the extent that there would be: 
• A large reduction in safety margins or functional capabilities, 
• Physical distress or higher workload such that the flight crew can-
not be relied upon to perform their task accurately or completely, 
or 
• Serious injury or fatal injury to a relatively small number of the 
occupants. 
Major Failure conditions which would reduce the capability of the airplane 
or the ability of the crew to cope with adverse operating conditions 
to the extent that there would be, for example: 
• A significant reduction in safety margins or functional capabili-
ties, 
• A significant increase in crew workload or in conditions impair-
ing crew efficiency, or 
• Discomfort to occupants, possibly including injuries. 
Minor Failure conditions which would not significantly reduce airplane 
safety, and which involve crew actions that are well within their 
capabilities. Minor failure conditions may include, for example: 
• Slight reduction of safety margins, 
• Slight increase in crew workload, or 
• Some inconvenience to occupants. 
After the classification of a condition, a classification of frequency or proba-
bility of occurrence is given. Qualitative definitions of probability according to the 
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JAA standard are given in Table 2. 
Table 2. Definitions of frequency levels according to JAR 25 
Description Estimate of frequency 
Probable Anticipated to occur one or more times during the entire op-
erational life of each airplane. 
Remote Unlikely to occur to each airplane during its total operational 
life but which may occur several times when considering the 
total operational life of a number of airplanes of the type. 
Extremely Remote 
Extremely Improbable 
Unlikely to occur when considering the total operational life of 
all airplanes of the type, but nevertheless, has to be considered 
as being possible. 
So unlikely that they are not anticipated to occur during the 
entire operational life of all airplanes of one type. 
In JAR 25 the terms probable, remote, extremely remote and extremely im-
probable arc also expressed in terms of acceptable numerical frequency ranges for 
each flight hour, as follows: 
Table 3. Qualitative definitions of frequency levels 
Probable Failure condition frequency is more than 10 5 per aircraft 
flight hour. 
Remote Failure condition frequency is between I0~7 and I 0 - 5 per 
aircraft flight hour 
Extremely remote Failure condition frequency is between 10~9 and 10"7 per 
aircraft flight hour 
Extremely improbable Failure condition frequency is less than 10 - 9 per aircraft flight 
hour. 
JAR 25 allows failure conditions with the following combinations of severity 
and frequency: 
• Minor severity may be probable. 
• Major severity must be no more frequent than remote. 
• Hazardous severity must be no more frequent than extremely remote. 
• Catastrophic severity must be extremely improbable. 
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According to the rules described above, each airplane manufacturer sets its 
internal rules for development and manufacturing (system and hardware design and 
integration in Fig. 2). The feedback from operators (airlines) to manufacturers is 
strong, all events related to safety are recorded and analyzed. An alerting algorithm 
is introduced to distinguish events caused by random fault or error from the events 
originating from a common cause such as improper maintenance rules and activities, 
improper design etc., which require immediate actions. 
4.3. Railway Transportation 
In railway transportation, new European standards EN 50126 [3], EN 50128 and 
EN 50129 define the methods which can be applied to specify and set the required 
safety levels. Application of the SIL levels is obligatory, and the standards establish 
a link between tolerable hazard rates and SIL levels (see Table 4 below). SILO must 
be selected if there is no safety relevance. 
Table 4. THR and SIL in railway iransportation 
THR Required 
[1/hour] SIL 
THR < 10"10 4 
i o - 1 0 < THR < 0 . 3 * 1 0 - 8 3 
0.3*1(T8 < THR < 10"7 2 
lO"7 < THR < 0.3 * 10"5 1 
The methods determined by SIL and applicable in the software development 
are listed in the standards, and the application of the methods must be demonstrated 
in the approval procedure. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, the aims of the Safety Management Systems were summarized. As 
shown in this paper, there are fields where the SMS concept has been realized or 
introduced for the whole industry (e.g railways), but there is a chance to implement 
the SMS in road transportation or to expand the concept for the whole transportation 
sector by establishing global safety criteria. 
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